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INTERPRETING RAHNER'S METAPHORIC LOGIC 
ROBERT MASSON 
Recent provocative reinterpretations of Karl Rahner's theology 
illustrate the hermeneutical challenge of retrieving his achievement 
for a new era. The spectrum of positions is exemplified by Karen 
Kilby, Patrick Burke, and Philip Endean. The essay proposes an 
alternative interpretive scheme attentive to Rahner's metaphoric 
logic. 
ANEW GENERATION OF SCHOLARS is raising fundamental questions about the balance, coherence, and foundations of Rahner's theology. 
They are bringing new questions and theological contexts to his thought 
and bringing Rahner's thought to bear on questions that had not been at 
the center of his attention—if on his horizon at all. While many of his 
former students and disciples have been content to explain and interpret 
Rahner in his own terms, this new generation seeks explanatory schemes 
that are not at all or much less dependent on his own conceptual framework 
and technical vocabulary. In critically engaging Rahner's texts, they take 
apparent discontinuities seriously while eschewing both overly generous 
harmonizations and unsympathetic caricatures. Their readings of Rahner 
illustrate the hermeneutical challenge of retrieving his achievement for a 
new theological era. 
The spectrum of reinterpretations is exemplified by Karen Kilby, Patrick 
Burke, and Philip Endean.1 Others could be cited, but these three illustrate 
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1
 See Karen Kilby, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), a revision of her dissertation, "The Vorgriff auf esse: A Study in 
the Relation of Philosophy to Theology in the Thought of Karl Rahner" (Ph.D., 
diss., Yale University, 1994); Patrick J. Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner: A Critical 
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both the breadth of interpretations and the concern that something is out of 
balance in conventional accounts. Kilby proposes to save Rahner's thought 
by a nonfoundationalist reading. While admitting that this nonfounda-
tionalist reinterpretation does not square with some of Rahner's texts and 
explicit positions, she contends that his later theology is incompatible with 
the earlier philosophy. In any case, she argues, his theology does not need 
his philosophy as a foundation and is more persuasive without it. 
Burke, at the other end of the spectrum, defends a thoroughly 
foundationalist reinterpretation, suggesting that "dialectical analogy" is 
the key to understanding how Rahner endeavors to keep the various polar-
ities of his thought in balance both with each other and with the Catholic 
dogmatic tradition. In Burke's view, however, the philosophical grounding 
of Rahner's thought is fundamentally flawed. Balance is saved precariously 
only by Rahner's genius and personal fidelity to the Church. Ultimately, 
the flaws in his philosophical foundations make it difficult for Rahner to 
sustain the intended equilibrium—particularly in his later work and in its 
appropriation by "Rahnerians" who, Burke suggests, often lack Rahner's 
intellectual subtlety and loyalty to Catholic doctrine. This leads Burke, like 
Kilby, to challenge standard readings of key positions and texts. 
By and large, Endean's reinterpretation coheres more closely with typi-
cal lines of Rahnerian scholarship. He argues that the questions about 
balance and foundations stem from misreading Rahner's contribution as 
simply and primarily a "liberal" corrective to an overemphasis on the 
authority of tradition and the institutional Church. That account, however, 
misses the fundamental "subversiveness" of Rahner's achievement. So 
Endean also argues that the key to interpretation requires a revisionary 
account with respect to conventional understandings of Rahner's project. 
I propose an alternative explanatory scheme for reading Rahner. While 
my hermeneutic shares Endean's fundamental position on the originality of 
Rahner's thought, it looks for a more precise description of exactly how 
Rahner's metaphoric logic reframes the conventional theological fields of 
meanings and thus avoids difficulties such as those associated with either 
foundationalism or nonfoundationalism. This article is merely a sketch. 
Articulating an alternative reading would require its own book-length 
study. Likewise, the three commentators' extensive exposition and argu-
mentation call for much thicker analyses than can be provided in an article. 
Study of His Major Themes (New York: Fordham University, 2002); Burke, "Con-
ceptual Thought in Karl Rahner," Gregorianum 75 (1994) 65-93; Philip Endean 
"Has Rahnerian Theology a Future?" in The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Rahner, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity, 2005) 281-96; Endean, "Karl Rahner im englischsprachigen Raum," Stimmen 
der Zeit, special issue on Rahner, 222 (2004) 57-74; and Endean, Karl Rahner and 
Ignatian Spirituality (New York: Oxford University, 2001). 
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Although much in their reinterpretations is contentious, they are not 
merely "cherry picking," to use Endean's colorful description of authors 
who pull out ideas from Rahner's work with absolutely no regard for their 
grounding in his larger theological vision.2 Rather, these readings arise 
from opposed ways of framing the interpretation. The framing is key to 
the projects. Hence my focus will be on the framing of interpretation—both 
their framing and Rahner's—as key to moving discussion forward. 
NONFOUNDATIONALISM AS INTERPRETIVE KEY 
Karen Kilby reads Rahner through a strong nonfoundationalist lens. She 
argues that this corrects common misreadings and makes it possible to 
bring his thought more directly into conversation with influential currents 
in philosophy and theology in the English-speaking world. For the moment, 
my objective is to describe how she frames this reading rather than to 
contest her interpretation of particular texts and conceptions.3 My assess­
ment of her strategy and the readings to which it leads will be elaborated in 
due course. 
Kilby grants that foundationalism is primarily "a term of criticism, a way 
of identifying what is problematic in another person's position."4 In philos­
ophy the issue is an overreaction to skepticism—an "excessive desire for 
certainty, for intellectual security and closure; it is philosophy over­
reaching itself."5 In theology the difficulty is "the assumption that Christian 
beliefs, if they are to be justified, require a foundation in something inde­
pendent of and prior to the Christian faith."6 She admits that "one meets 
few self-described foundationalists."7 Moreover, she concedes that her 
nonfoundationalist prescription applies a focus on Rahner's work that was 
not his own. Nevertheless, she argues, the lens is appropriate because so 
many of the criticisms aimed at Rahner—and defenses—interpret his work 
either explicitly or implicitly in foundationalist or semifoundationalist 
terms. 
The primary advantage of a nonfoundationalist reading, for Kilby, is that 
it unhinges Rahner's theological insights from philosophical positions that 
have been the source of criticism and that she herself judges unpersuasive. 
Second, this reading accounts for shifts that she discerns between Rahner's 
earlier philosophical work and his theology. Third, her reinterpretation 
2
 Endean, "Karl Rahner im englischsprachigen Raum" 62,73 η. 20. 
3
 I take this course because her interpretation of Rahner, as well as her responses 
to the standard Rahnerian interpretations, is driven by the framing. Disputes about 
the meaning of particular texts, philosophical conceptions, and theological notions 
are unlikely to progress without clarification of that larger framing of the issues. 
4
 Kilby, Karl Rahner 2. 5 Ibid. 5. 
6
 Ibid. 6. 7 Ibid. 2. 
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proposes to overcome inherent tensions and inconsistencies within his the­
ology. Finally, she contends that Rahner's appeal to "pre-thematic experi­
ence," which is commonly read as playing a foundational role, "is best seen 
as something to which his theology concludes rather than as its supposed 
starting point."8 
Kilby's construal of Rahner's theology as nonfoundationalist and her 
defense of its contribution entail a simultaneous and substantial critique: a 
fundamental criticism of his earlier philosophical work, a denial of an 
overarching philosophical unity in his thought, as well as affirmation of 
significant contradictions within his theology. This prescription puts her at 
odds with most of Rahner's critics and admirers, and also with many of his 
explicit statements. It is a provocative prescription, but it makes a very 
convincing case on behalf of Rahner for those in the English speaking 
world whose philosophical leanings are in the Analytic tradition or whose 
theological inclinations are Postliberal. The reinterpretation does this by 
excising objectionable parts from Rahner on the grounds that they are not 
essential to his mature theology and that his theology is more coherent and 
persuasive without them. 
Kilby first examines Rahner's contention in his early philosophical works 
that a Vorgriff auf esse and consequent dynamism toward God is 
presupposed in the act of judgment. She provides a concise and rather 
standard overview of Rahner's argument that the recognition of particular 
beings in abstraction ultimately presupposes a grasp of being-as-such. She 
does "not offer anything like an exhaustive critique here,"9 but she assesses 
this argument in Spirit in the World from a philosophical perspective very 
different from Rahner's. Rahnerians would contend that this leads to egre­
gious misunderstandings. In any case, appealing to fundamental doubts that 
Wittgensteinian thinkers would have about Rahner's line of argumenta­
tion, Kilby initially asks rhetorically whether he is "being unduly led by 
the suggestiveness of Aristotelian/Thomistic language of the matter 'limit­
ing' the form and of the 'liberation' of forms.'"10 She objects on narrow 
grounds that the argument trades on a pivotal equivocation between the 
sort of "limitation" involved in "applying a general (universal) concept to a 
particular thing" (e.g., "This is a rabbit.") and a second sort of "limitation" 
involved in recognizing that any particular thing "is limited insofar as it is 
one thing and not everything."11 Rahner's argument, she concludes, is 
"either a tautology or a non sequitur" but hardly a convincing foundationalist 
argument for an implicit Vorgriff of being-as-such.12 Kilby then argues 
more broadly, on the basis of discussions among Analytic philosophers, 
8
 Ibid. 10. 9 Ibid. 29. 
1 0
 Ibid. u Ibid. 30. 
1 2
 ΤΚ;Λ 
384 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
that the very possibility of transcendental arguments is doubtful. The claim 
of such demonstrations to have found the one and only condition of possi-
bility to explain a given phenomenon presupposes that all other possible 
explanations have been considered and found unwarranted. She contends 
that in principle it is impossible to imagine, let alone consider and rule out 
as satisfactory, all other possible explanations.13 
Kilby adds an indirect and more explicitly theological rationale for a 
nonfoundationalist reading. She contends that the argument in Hearer of 
the Word and its conception of revelation are at odds with Rahner's later 
notion of the supernatural existential.14 In her unorthodox construal, 
a sharp either/or distinction runs through Hearer of the Word between 
revelation, which is communicated by God, and ordinary human knowl-
edge, which is available through introspection and discursive reasoning. 
She interprets the supernatural existential as "a communication of God 
that is part of the ordinary human make-up, accessible, however imper-
fectly, to ordinary means of knowledge."15 If there is a transcendental 
supernatural existential that makes God accessible, she asks, then what real 
need is there for further historical revelation? On the other hand, if histor-
ical revelation is necessary—the position of Hearer of the Word—then on 
her view there can be no supernatural existential. She argues that the 
disparity between these two positions reveals a fundamental contradiction 
between Rahner's earlier philosophical argumentation and his later theo-
logical understandings of revelation and grace. 
Kilby alleges that the same tension is evident in Rahner's explanation of 
the supernatural existential itself. She discerns two versions: a weaker one 
that sees the supernatural existential as only a potency for grace, and a 
stronger one that identifies the supernatural existential as such with grace 
and revelation.16 The stronger version, she contends, puts in question "the 
13
 Ibid. 43-48. 
14
 Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word: Laying the Foundation for a Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. and trans. Andrew Talion (New York: Continuum, 1994; originally 
published as Hörer des Wortes: Zur Grundlegung einer Religionsphilosophie 
(Munich: Kösel-Pustet, 1941). 
15
 Rahner, Hearer of the Word 62. 
16
 In the "weaker version" of the supernatural existential, Kilby reduces God's 
actually offered self-communication to a human potency. Her "stronger version" 
collapses the distinction between invitation and response. Her analysis misses the 
dynamic character of this process for reasons that I will explain later in the article. 
David Coffey argues against the notion that Rahner's later reflections on the super-
natural existential are in conflict with the earlier writings. In an article published the 
same year as Kilby's book, he concludes that "one can say unhesitatingly that the 
only major change that occurred was one of context and perspective" (Coffey, 
"The Whole Rahner on the Supernatural Existential," Theological Studies 65 
[2004] 95-118, at 110). 
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possibility of a purely philosophical analysis of human nature in the techni-
cal sense of the word." That, she believes, was the intention of the early 
philosophical works.17 On her reading of Rahner's later theological inves-
tigations, philosophy as such can have no genuine role: the presence of the 
supernatural existential would mean that philosophy could have "no way of 
knowing precisely what belongs to nature and what does not."18 Efforts by 
Johannes Metz in the second edition of Hearer of the Word and similar 
attempts by Rahnerians to harmonize these themes, Kilby argues, "can 
only lead to confusion" because the notions are based on "a different 
conception of the way revelation is related to the rest of human experi-
ence."19 Rahner contends in Hearer of the Word that God is free to speak 
or remain silent. Kilby alleges that this characterization is incompatible 
with the conception later in Foundations of Christian Faith that God is 
given in the supernatural existential and therefore is not silent.20 
For further evidence of the inconsistency, Kilby contrasts Rahner's 
emphasis on inescapable pluralism in philosophy and theology with his 
appeals to the transcendental. She regards transcendental arguments as 
efforts to overcome pluralism through religiously neutral, universally appli-
cable, and logically persuasive demonstrations. One cannot have both tran-
scendental arguments, in this sense, and incorrigible pluralism. She grants 
that many interpretations of Rahner are not foundationalist in such a strict 
sense but rather "semi-foundationalist." By "semi-foundationalist" she 
means interpretations that suppose that only certain key points of his 
theology, not the whole of it, are derived from and require the support of 
"an independently demonstrated philosophy."21 But even if transcendental 
arguments support only particular aspects of Rahner's thought, Kilby holds 
that this still relativizes his claims about the inescapability and extent of 
pluralism.22 Moreover, on such semifoundationalist readings, if Rahner's 
key philosophical demonstrations prove unconvincing, then "large swatches 
of Rahner's theology must collapse with it."23 
Hence Kilby argues for a nonfoundationalist reading that takes 
Rahner's Foundations as paradigmatic, interpreting it "as a work of the-
ology from start to finish, which in fact contains no independent philoso-
phy."24 What looks like philosophy is "pure theology," that is to say, 
meant to be judged only on theological grounds according to whether it 
contributes to a convincing interpretation of Christianity.25 This reading 
17
 Kilby, Karl Rahner 67. 18 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 63. Although Metz's revisions in the second edition (Munich: Kösel, 
1963) were endorsed by Rahner, the first edition provides a clearer indication of 
the genesis of Rahner's thought. 
20
 Ibid. 68. 21 Ibid. 76. 
22
 Ibid. 94. 23 Ibid. 76. 
24
 Ibid. 79. 25 Ibid. 81-82. 
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takes pluralism seriously, relativizing Rahner's allegedly transcendental 
theology as an ad hoc advocacy of one theological position among many. 
Kilby argues that there are sound theological reasons for advancing the 
Vorgriff auf esse, so use of the notion does not have to appeal to uncon-
vincing philosophical demonstrations that also conflict, on her reading, 
with the notion of the supernatural existential. Moreover, she suggests, 
both notions and the consequent conceptual framework are not the phil-
osophical basis for Rahner's theology but rather an understanding to 
which it concludes. 
This reading, which reworks themes from Kilby's dissertation, exem-
plifies something of a tradition at Yale of advancing schemes for explaining 
Rahner framed in terms other than his own. There is much to applaud in 
these efforts. Reinterpreting Rahner from the outside, as it were, is essen-
tial if Rahner's achievement is to be retrieved for the present and future. 
Only a shrinking cadre of scholars is familiar enough with Rahner's Scho-
lastic and transcendental interlocutors to engage explanations articulated 
entirely within those frameworks and specialized vocabularies. A broader 
reception, even among the current generation of theologians, not to 
mention a broader public, will require translation into new theological, 
spiritual, and practical idioms. 
At the same time, this highlights the significant limitation of Kilby's 
reinterpretation. The development of her nonfoundationalist critique 
and her exposition of Rahner's thought are interwoven at every stage. 
I will return to her proposal in the concluding section where I will argue 
that the alleged contradictions are not inherent in Rahner's work but rather 
in the interpretive focus Kilby brings to it. Her account hinges on her 
narrow construal of philosophy as neutral and universally persuasive 
demonstration plotted exclusively at the intersection of foundationalist, 
semifoundationalist, and nonfoundationalist axes. In Endean I will find a 
persuasive argument against taking foundationalism in this way as a 
hegemonic interpretive key. I will argue, further, that there is an alternative 
way to interpret Rahner "from the outside" that does not require playing 
off the earlier philosophical work against the later theological investiga-
tions, and that avoids the dangers of foundationalism without requiring 
Kilby's strained readings of Rahner's texts—often against their presump-
tive meanings.26 
Kilby, of course, while admitting that Rahner at some points "sounds more of 
a semi-foundationalist than a non-foundationalist" (ibid. 99), would insist that the 
consensus among Rahnerians about the presumptive meanings of his texts presup-
poses the foundationalist reading and coherence of the early philosophical and later 
theological work that her nonfoundationalist reading challenges. 
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DIALECTICAL ANALOGY AS INTERPRETIVE KEY 
Patrick Burke reads Rahner quite differently than Kilby but still pre-
sumes a foundationalist axis of interpretation. He argues that "Rahner's 
theology is rightly recognized as a theological system because of the 
fundamental unity that runs throughout his writings."27 Burke maintains 
that the key to this unity was elaborated in Spirit in the World and 
Hearer of the Word.28 "Those who attempt to interpret Rahner without 
reference to these early philosophical writings or who dismiss them as 
unconnected to his later theology not only misunderstand him but also 
run the risk of distorting his remarkably nuanced and balanced system 
of thought."29 
At the heart of Rahner's "system," Burke contends, is "dialectical 
analogy." This is a term he uses, following his mentor John McDermott, to 
characterize—in a way at odds with most Rahner scholars—the founda-
tional principle of Rahner's metaphysics, epistemology, and theology.30 My 
first objective, as with Kilby above, is to describe how Burke employs this 
notion to frame his reinterpretation of Rahner. My assessment follows. 
Burke and McDermott contend that the dialectical analogy manifests 
itself in Spirit in the World's description of human knowing as a dynamic 
hovering, or Schwebe, between the horizon of being and the sensible 
singular.31 The metaphysical grounding for this, they argue, is in humanity's 
very structure as finite, embodied spirit, which Rahner envisions as 
Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner vii. 
28
 Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych (New York: Continuum, 
1994; originally published as Geist in Welt: Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis 
bei Thomas von Aquin, ed. Johannes Baptist Metz [Munich: Kösel, 1957]). 
29
 Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner viii. 
30
 For a very different interpretation see Leo O'Donovan, "Karl Rahner, S J 
(1904-84): A Theologian for the Twenty-First Century," Theology Today 62 
(2005) 352-63, at 359 n. 23; here O'Donovan disputes this translation and interpre-
tation of Schwebe as "quite contrary to Rahner's clear intention." While O'Dono-
van, in my estimation, clarifies the many ways Rahner uses the term "dialectic" and 
clearly lays out the central notions in Rahner that speak against Burke's reading, 
my concern here is to offer a further hermeneutical explanation about why Rahner 
is often misread by interpreters like Burke. 
31
 See the following by John M. McDermott: "A New Approach to God's 
Existence," Thomist" 44 (1980) 219-50; "The Christologies of Karl Rahner, 
Part 1," Gregorianum 67 (1986) 87-123; "The Christologies of Karl Rahner, Part 2," 
Gregorianum 67 (1986) 297-327; "Sheehan, Rousselot, and Theological Method," 
Gregorianum 68 (1987) 705-17; "Karl Rahner on Two Infinities: God and Matter," 
International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1988) 439-57; "Dialectical Analogy: The 
Oscillating Center of Rahner's Thought," Gregorianum 75 (1994) 675-703; and 
"The Analogy of Knowing in Karl Rahner," International-Philosophical-Quarterly 
36 (1996) 201-16. 
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a "dynamic oscillating midpoint between God and the categorical world." 
But it is not just a matter of human knowing hovering between spirit and 
matter. Burke postulates a further epistemological oscillation. As one 
hovers between spirit and matter, one also moves either toward their 
unification or toward their divergence and distinction. Burke identifies 
the former with the unifying dynamism of judgment and the latter with 
conceptual distinction and abstraction. He characterizes the latter as static 
since, as he understands it, concepts abstract from time and place. He 
calls "this structure dialectical analogy because through it Rahner oscil-
lated constantly between unifying dynamism and conceptual distinction 
and therefore united dialectically while still holding in distinction the 
traditional antinomies of Christian thought—God and the world, spirit 
and matter, grace and nature."33 According to Burke's interpretation, 
"this complex and nuanced structure gave Rahner's thought remarkable 
balance and flexibility, allowing him to develop a theological system that 
was both new and dynamic and that also maintained all the distinctions 
necessary for orthodox Christianity."34 The greater part of Burke's rein-
terpretation aims to show how Rahner employed dialectical analogy as a 
principle for grounding Christian doctrinal claims metaphysically and for 
explaining them theologically. He is particularly concerned to demon-
strate, first, how the principle works in Rahner's theology to preserve 
both the unity and crucial distinctions between, for example, the natural 
and the supernatural in creation and grace, the human and divine in 
Jesus, and the changeable and unchangeable in dogma. Second, he 
endeavors to expose significant tensions within Rahner's thought that 
need to be "addressed by Rahnerian scholars if the complex and profound 
balance of his theological vision is not to be endangered or even lost."35 
The problem with Rahner's use of this principle, on Burke's reading, is 
that it is not adequately grounded metaphysically. Although Rahner 
declares his commitment to both sides of the polarity, his defense for this 
assertion is at best "weak."36 This undercuts Rahner's dialectical analogy 
itself and according to Burke is the source of critical ambiguities through-
out his theology. The basis for Burke's critique is worked out more fully in 
his article "Conceptual Thought in Karl Rahner."37 His analysis focuses on 
issues of Thomist metaphysics and is quite technical but for these reasons 
also somewhat more illuminating than his book. Burke situates his discus-
sion in the context of the Church's rejection of Modernism and nominalism. 
32
 Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner viii. Although "categorical" is frequently used in 
translations of Rahner's work, it has connotations in English that are misleading. 
I will use "categorial" instead. 
33
 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. xi. 36 Ibid. viii. 
37
 Burke, "Conceptual Thought in Karl Rahner," Gregorianum 75 (1994) 65-93. 
RAHNER'S METAPHORIC LOGIC 389 
He takes it as axiomatic that any relativization of conceptual knowledge 
undermines the validity of dogmatic affirmations. He contends that "tradi-
tional Thomists, following Cajetan, always maintained that man could 
know reality through his concepts; in this way they defended human reason 
from the challenge of nominalism."38 Thinkers such as Jacques Maritain 
stressed "the concept of being as the basis of metaphysics" because "if 
being is conceptualizeable, all reality can be known through concepts."39 
Burke insists that "even when Etienne Gilson maintained that Thomas 
arrived at reality through the existential judgement, he in no way put into 
doubt the validity of conceptual knowledge obtained by abstracting 
essences from sensible realities."40 
Burke contends that in both Maritain and Gilson the passive intellect, 
seen as a separate faculty, played a key role in this process of abstracting 
the essence from the sensible reality. In Spirit in the World, Rahner col-
lapses the distinction between the active and passive intellects.41 For him, 
sensibility, which emanates from spirit, becomes the receptive faculty of 
human knowledge with the result that "conceptual thought is defined, not 
as the liberation of the 'pure form' from its material supposite, but merely 
as the recognition by the active intellect of the sensibly perceived object as 
limited, repeatable, and hence universal."42 Moreover, Burke continues, 
Rahner insists that such abstracted concepts are always grasped only in 
reference to some concrete subject. As a result "the form/concept, for 
Rahner, is never fully 'abstracted' or 'isolated' from time or space, as it 
was in the Cajetanian tradition."43 At this point it is evident that Burke 
envisions only two alternatives: either a nominalist claim that concepts 
have no objective referents or Burke's interpretation of conceptualist Tho-
mism in which concepts grasp essences as "pure forms" that are entirely 
abstracted and isolated from time and space. He assumes that if Rahner 
does not ground concepts in some way analogous to conceptualist Tho-
mism,44 his efforts to forge an intrinsically balanced system cannot be saved 
38
 Ibid. 86. 39 Ibid. 80. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 In Reinterpreting Rahner 31-32 n. 84, Burke argues that Rahner's understand-
ing of this distinction "has been criticized widely as inadequate and untrue to 
Thomas," citing his own essay and earlier work by Cornelio Fabro, Peter Eicher, 
Josef Speck, and his mentor McDermott. 
42
 Burke, "Conceptual Thought" 83. 
43
 Ibid. 84. 
44
 "By conceptualist Thomism is intended that interpretation of St. Thomas's 
thought which maintains that esse can be grasped in an analogous concept and 
consequently that all reality can be conceptualized. The tradition of Cajetan and 
John of St. Thomas most strongly defended this position" (John M. McDermott, 
"The Analogy of Knowing in Karl Rahner," International Philosophical 
Quarterly 36 [1996] 102-16, at 206). 
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from readings that collapse into a Modernist relativization of dogma. Burke 
suggests that Thomas Sheehan's "atheological" interpretation of Rahner 
illustrates the room left for later Rahnerians to take such paths that under-
mine the very possibility of objective truth claims and doctrine.45 
These difficulties, Burke tells us, are reaffirmed in Foundations where 
Rahner addresses the analogy of being. In conventional Thomism the abil-
ity to grasp the world in valid concepts provides analogies for conceiving 
the reality of God. Rahner, on the other hand, argues that our transcenden-
tal experience is original and primary. Burke quotes a crucial passage from 
Foundations: 
Transcendence is the more original in relation to individual, categorical, univocal 
concepts. For transcendence, that is, reaching beyond towards the unlimited hori-
zon of the whole movement of our spirit, is precisely the condition of possibility, the 
horizon and the basis and ground by means of which we compare individual objects 
of experience with one another and classify them.46 
Burke recognizes how innovative this notion of analogy is. Rahner empha-
sizes that "analogy, therefore, has nothing to do with the notion of a sec-
ondary, inexact middle position between clear concepts and those which 
designate two completely different things with the same phonetic sound."47 
Rather, analogy refers to this original tension between our categorial 
starting point and the incomprehensibility of God.48 Burke interprets 
this analogy as corresponding again to the oscillation of the human spirit 
between experience of the concrete sensible and experience of God as 
holy mystery. But he wonders how the analogy can ever be adequately 
grounded. "Within this knowing process there seems to be no prime 
analogate. Man has analogous knowledge of God from his experience of 
earthly realities, and an analogous knowledge of earthly realities from his 
transcendental experience of God."49 The result, Burke concludes, is that 
concepts are always and only approximations of the subject's experience of 
reality, "and it is, therefore, difficult to see how the concept has not been 
already and always relativized, existing only as a shadow of the reality it 
seeks to capture."50 While Rahner and "the best Transcendental Thomists 
have always sought to maintain the validity of conceptual knowledge, lest 
dogma be relativized and Modernism reemerge," Burke doubts whether 
in the end Rahner adequately grounds the validity of conceptual thought 
45
 See Thomas Sheehan, Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations (Athens: 
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over against this stress on the transcendental, intuitive, nonconceptual 
grasp of reality.51 
Each thematic chapter in Burke's Reinterpreting Rahner concludes its 
exposition with a summary of the tensions and ambiguities inherent in 
Rahner's positions. Most of this is derived from earlier critiques.52 What is 
original, but very much open to question, is whether oscillation between 
unifying dynamism and static conceptualization is the key to understanding 
what Rahner is up to in the instances cited and whether it is his "weakness" 
in grounding the latter that "accounts for the progressively stronger 
emphasis on the dynamic, unifying side of his thought in his later works."53 
Burke identifies this alleged weakness as both the source of serious ambi-
guities and "also the reason why so many commentators have pushed 
Rahner's system further than Rahner himself either went or would have 
gone."54 Burke contends that "sensing the inconsistency of the conceptual-
izing moment within the knowing process and also the priority of the 
dynamism in his later development, these commentators all too often have 
interpreted Rahner according to only one side of his thought. In doing so, 
they not infrequently have lost the balance and nuance of Rahner's original 
perspective."55 
While I can see no reason to quarrel with the generalization that a 
central feature of Rahner is his consistent affirmation of the balance 
between our unity with and distinction from God, and the many theological 
variations on that motif, the crucial questions are how to conceive that 
balance, whether Burke's interpretation of it as a hovering dialectical anal-
ogy describes it accurately, and whether foundationalism is the most help-
ful interpretive key for approaching the issue. I mentioned earlier in my 
discussion of Kilby that Endean offers a persuasive argument against mak-
ing foundationalism the primary interpretive lens for reading Rahner. I will 
consider this next. In my final section I will argue for a different conclusion 
and an alternative interpretive scheme. 
SELF-DISCLOSING MYSTERY AS INTERPRETIVE KEY 
Endean does not comment explicitly on Kilby or Burke, but he questions 
whether foundationalism is the most helpful interpretive lens through 
which to read Rahner. That way of framing the issue gets at a partial truth 
but misses the most significant feature of Rahner's achievement. Endean 
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agrees that it has been common for both followers and critics to focus on 
Rahner's contribution to a liberalization in Catholic theology and ecclesi-
ology in the years before and after Vatican II. He cites the assessments of 
Anne Carr and Hans Urs von Balthasar as typical: in their interpretations 
"Rahner appears as a man struggling to hold together two potentially 
competing values: grace present universally in human experience at large, 
and the external authority of the Church and its tradition."56 Carr regards 
Rahner's approach as creative and as a renewal of Catholic identity; 
Balthasar regards it as confused and as a seductive threat. Like Burke on 
this matter, Endean holds "that a correct reading of Rahner depends on 
recognizing that this temptation [giving systematic preference to one value 
at the expense of the other] is to be avoided."57 
Unlike Burke or Kilby, however, Endean cautions against framing the 
interpretation of Rahner narrowly in terms of the struggle in the Church 
between liberal and conservative responses to modernity. One problem 
with that account is the implication that any theology that offers a more 
nuanced explanation of the limitations of authority and tradition is inevita-
bly taken as advocacy of the cause ascribed to Liberal Protestantism and 
Catholic Modernism. Rahner's contribution to aggiornamento in Catholic 
theology tells only half the story. Contrary to Burke and Kilby, Endean 
argues that "it is an error to see Rahner's most characteristic insights as a 
response to the 'problems of the modern world.'"58 Rahner was also con-
scious of "how 'modern' patterns of thought and affiliation distort the 
reality of Catholic, Christian, truth," and he endeavored to correct that 
tendency as well.59 It was not just a matter of maintaining the dialectic 
between one side or the other, as Burke argues. Nor was it simply a matter 
of adjusting traditional theological notions to accommodate a greater 
appreciation of modernity's emphasis on the dynamic, the subject, and 
historicity, which Burke suggests was Rahner's weakness and which 
Kilby argues was his strength. In Endean's view, Rahner sought to subvert 
that very way of framing the question. "The conventional picture of Rahner 
obscures how he was trying to move Christianity forward from the deficient 
epistemology which gave rise to a sense of inevitable conflict between 
tradition and innovation."60 
Endean, citing his own study of Rahner and Ignatian spirituality 
and Schwerdtfeger's research drawing on Finnish Lutheran theologian 
Tuomo Mannermaa, argues that Rahner's biography indicates a different 
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trajectory.61 Rahner's most creative theological insights developed when 
he was "a young man, in isolated academic and seminary settings."62 
They emerged in reaction to the Scholastic theology of his professors, from 
his study of Scripture and historical theology, and from his formation in 
the Spiritual Exercises, although Endean cautions against overemphasizing 
the latter's influence.63 He gives a lucid and concise summary of his 
conclusions: 
Rahner's account of how we know God's grace privileges neither subject nor object. 
Our discoveries in knowledge are essentially interactive: the external object can 
affect us only if there is a disposition within us; and this disposition becomes 
conscious only when the object affects the human mind from outside. The funda-
mental reliability of the system is not directly accessible either through the subject 
or the object, but rather through a God who is source of both and works through 
both in ways that are quite mysterious.64 
This interpretation, in contrast to Kilby's and Burke's, emphasizes how 
Rahner's view subverts both poles of the foundationalist/nonfounda-
tionalist scheme and any mediating semifoundationalist positions. Rahner's 
"epistemology of self-disclosing mystery" resituates the relationship between 
nature and grace, and between all the related antinomies of Christian faith. 
Endean likens the effect of this epistemology to the way Wittgenstein's 
critique of ostensive definition as normative subverted the conventional 
interpretation of how language refers.65 
To speak of a "purely philosophical" foundationalism as opposed to a 
"purely theological" nonfoundationalism, as Kilby does, is foreign to 
Rahner. He does not privilege one over the other. Nor does his understand-
ing of the relationship between faith and reason, or grace and nature, 
oppose them in the manner suggested by Burke's conception of dialectical 
analogy. In that sense, but only in that sense, I would concur, and suspect 
Endean would, with the description of Rahner as nonfoundationalist. 
But this would not mean that the way to save Rahner from the diffi-
culties of foundationalism is to reject his earlier philosophical work as 
foundationalist in favor of his later allegedly nonfoundationalist theology. 
Rahner's thought does not have to be saved by a nonfoundationalist read-
ing because he never advocated foundationalism. Reinterpreting Rahner as 
a foundationalist, semifoundationalist, or nonfoundationalist distorts his 
position. Rahner's thought subverts that grid in favor of an alternative 
logic. On the one hand, he never proposed that theology depends in a 
61
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foundationalist way on an independent and prior philosophy. On the other 
hand, he consistently held that philosophy is distinct from theology and has 
its own integrity even as it plays a genuine role in theological reflection. 
Likewise, while a "dialectic" of sorts does situate the human between the 
finite and infinite, the dialectic is not founded on a Schwebe—and particu-
larly not if this is understood as a hovering back and forth between opposed 
poles (grace over against nature, the divine over against the human, the 
supernatural over against the natural, the transcendent over against the 
categorial, the eschatological over against the provisional, the unchange-
able over against the changeable). These are not opposed poles. The 
destiny and meaning of creation are realized in the dialogue between 
humanity and God initiated by God's mysterious self-communication in 
our midst, that is to say, by God's self-communication in Jesus and his 
Spirit. Consequently the divine is ultimately mediated through Jesus in 
our very humanity with all its embodied, interpersonal, social, historical, 
and cultural density. This conception of God's self-disclosing mystery 
highlighted in Endean's reinterpretation privileges neither the sort 
of "purely" theological grounding that Kilby espouses nor the "purely" 
philosophical foundation Burke supposes. 
METAPHORIC ANALOGY AS INTERPRETIVE KEY 
Endean summarizes his reading of Rahner in terms based on "what 
Chesterton once said about Christianity: It is not that Rahner's theology 
has been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and therefore 
not really tried."66 This is a colorful exaggeration. Endean has in view 
primarily misreadings of Rahner in religious journalism or by theological 
critics who have read Rahner superficially or who, like Balthasar, start with 
fundamentally different intuitions about the sort of witness that revelation 
in Christ makes possible and requires.67 Such differences in fundamental 
intuitions and whatever dissimilarities derive from framing interpretations 
on modernity's foundationalist/nonfoundationalist axis offer only partial 
explanations of the divergent readings. These explanations do not satisfac-
torily account for why commentators such as Kilby and Burke, who could 
hardly be described as merely "cherry picking," come to conclusions that 
differ so much from each other, as well as from the interpretations of more 
conventional Rahnerians. Moreover, Kilby and Burke are just two exam-
ples. Others could be cited. Also to be explained are the significant diver-
gences even among those whom Kilby and Burke apparently group 
together as Rahnerians, for example, between Thomas Sheehan's reading 
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and the influential interpretations in the English-speaking world of 
American Jesuits who studied under Rahner such as William Dych, Leo 
O'Donovan, and Harvey Egan.68 
Kilby, Burke, and Endean note other partial explanations for the diver-
gence. Much of Rahner's writing had an occasional nature and was not 
always precise or consistent. Endean observes, for example, that when 
Rahner "was focusing on one particular problem, he had the habit of 
presupposing conventional positions . . . on other problems. This he could 
do, even when he himself had elsewhere criticized these conventional 
accounts radically. It follows," Endean concludes, "that a hostile critic 
could certainly find evidence to make a case for incoherence in Rahner's 
writings regarding experience and authority."69 But the people in question, 
despite their reservations and critiques, intend attentive and in many 
respects sympathetic readings. The divergence of interpretations and 
the confidence with which they are advanced beg for a clearer and fuller 
explanation. 
Endean is correct in suggesting that the divergence stems from readers 
missing the fundamentally subversive character of Rahner's epistemology 
of self-disclosing mystery. But Endean's understanding of that epistemol-
ogy does not differ substantially from that of many, if not most, Rahner 
scholars. His reading is consistent, for example, with interpreters such as 
Dych, O'Donovan, and Egan. Why do Kilby and Burke miss what others 
take as so central? The incorrigibility of such divergent interpretations 
requires something more than yet another insider's exposition of Rahner's 
epistemology and its implications. It requires a more precise and construc-
tive description of how Rahner's conceptual moves are subversive. How 
exactly does Rahner subvert and reframe the theological terrain? Why is 
the subversion apparently obvious to some interpreters yet missed by 
others? My intent in raising these questions is neither merely to defend 
conventional interpretations of Rahner nor to deny any value to alternative 
readings. My goal is (1) to explain how the logic of Rahner's thinking and 
particularly how specific steps in his argumentation enable such divergent 
readings, and (2) to propose some criteria for interpretation. 
Put simply, I believe the divergence of readings lies in the metaphoric 
character of Rahner's thought. I could say "analogical" here as well as 
"metaphoric," but it will be important to understand how what I mean by 
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"metaphoric analogy" differs from what Burke and McDermott have in 
mind when they speak of "dialectical analogy." 
Metaphoric Analogy 
The concept of metaphoric analogy that I am proposing is not derived 
directly from Rahner. I believe there is some virtue in this. I acknowledged 
earlier that, given the difficulty of Rahner's thought and its specialized 
vocabulary, it is helpful to offer ways of explaining what he is doing that 
do not presuppose his framework from the start.70 "Metaphoric analogy" is 
derived from Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell's conception of metaphoric 
process.71 This conception offers a new way of describing a key aspect of 
Aquinas's use of analogous language—at least as David Burrell interprets 
it.72 A brief digression explaining Gerhart and Russell's conception and my 
application of it to BurrelPs reading of Aquinas will prepare for the further 
application of "metaphoric analogy" to describe the logic of Rahner's 
thought. 
Burrell suggests that to understand Aquinas's thought, it is crucial to 
focus on how he uses analogous language. If we do this, he claims, it 
becomes apparent that Aquinas's appeal to analogy at its core is not pro-
posing any sort of direct comparison (whether of proportion, proportional-
ity, or attribution) between some natural reality and God. Rather, Aquinas 
stretches our usual ways of speaking to lead us to insights we could not 
otherwise reach. For example, on Burrell's reading, when Aquinas speaks 
of God's simplicity, he is not pointing to some experience of simplicity in 
the natural world that is in some ways like and in some ways different from 
divine simplicity. The logic of his appeal is just the opposite. He observes 
70
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that we understand natural realities by locating them in terms of various 
kinds of composition (form and matter, essence and existence, act and 
potency, substance and accident, genus and species, etc.). Aquinas demon-
strates that if God is to be what Christian faith confesses, then none of 
these conceptual approaches enables us to grasp God, at least in any way 
comparable to natural realities. To say that God is simple in this sense, it 
turns out, is to stretch toward an idea of simplicity that has no comparison 
to what we experience as simplicity in any worldly reality. 
Of the composites just mentioned, the crucial couplet in Aquinas's talk 
about God is essence and existence. But in the case of God, Aquinas says 
the most extraordinary thing: that God's essence is esse, or being-as-such. 
The difficulty with this affirmation is that "being" is not a predicate in the 
normal sense. Analytical philosophers who seized on such use of "being" as 
a category error are correct that the rules of predication are broken in this 
statement. Aquinas is using an assertion (a claim that something is) as a 
predication (a statement that something has this or that quality). So again, 
this "analogous" use of language does not deliver a concept for God that in 
some ways is like and in some ways different from our concepts of natural 
realities. Aquinas is stretching language, breaking one of the most funda-
mental rules of discourse (the distinction between saying that something is 
and saying what it is) to intimate a divine reality that is beyond the grasp of 
any concepts. 
We can go beyond BurrelPs analysis, but in a way consistent with it, by 
noting that, on this reading, when St. Thomas says that God is simple, or 
that God's being is "to be," he affirms an identity and "forces an analogy" 
in a unexpected way between two known concepts. Given the conventional 
world of meanings the analogy is unwarranted. The consequence of forcing 
the analogy between the concepts is that it changes the field of meanings 
associated with both. If God is simple in the way suggested, then we are 
intimating a concept of simplicity that is like no other. I say "intimating," 
because the point is that we cannot locate what simplicity means here 
except by distinguishing how this meaning is different from any of the other 
ways that we might affirm simplicity of something. Likewise, if God is 
simple in this way, then "God" (and the concept "God") also must be 
affirmed in distinction from every other being (and every other concept). 
God cannot be thought of as another reality in the world or even outside it, 
except in a very different way. To say that God is simple in this way opens 
up very different conceptual space for thinking about what simplicity is and 
who God is. The logic of simplicity in this changed and new field of mean-
ings is different from simplicity in the conventional senses of the term. It is 
likewise for the concept of God. 
To make an affirmation that within a given field of meanings is 
unwarranted (i.e., breaks the rules) and that changes our larger fields of 
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meanings is an example of what Gerhart and Russell call metaphoric 
process. The process of forcing analogies creates the possibility to say 
things that could not otherwise be said. It creates new conceptual and 
logical space. They maintain that the same kind of thing happened in 
the history of science. Newton equated earthly and heavenly mechanics. 
Copernicus insisted that the sun is the center of our solar system, not 
the earth. William Thomson and James Prescott Joule asserted that heat 
is motion. Einstein affirmed that Galileo's concept of relativity applied 
not only to mechanical phenomena but to electromagnetic phenomena 
as well, leading to his metaphoric insistence that the laws of physics and 
the speed of light are the same for all observers regardless of their 
position or motion.73 These affirmations, unwarranted in the science of 
the day, fundamentally changed the larger fields of meanings. These 
metaphoric affirmations created conceptual and logical possibilities for 
imagining, conceiving, and talking about things that before the meta-
phoric act were unavailable, and that even after it can seem quite 
counterintuitive. Hence, in speaking of "metaphoric process," Gerhart 
and Russell are not speaking of the sort of figurative language that we 
often have in mind when we speak of "metaphors." 
It is also important to note that the forced analogy and alteration in fields 
of meanings in such cases are not necessarily at the level of concepts. In the 
instance of Aquinas's affirmation that God is simple, the shifts in fields of 
meanings are an implication of a move that Burrell characterizes as gram-
matical. Aquinas uses "simplicity," although grammatically a substantive, 
as shorthand for denying that any substantives, at least as we know them, 
can apply to God. Aquinas's affirmation that the nature of God is esse 
operates at a deeper level, since to display and speak of what is beyond 
language's grasp he forces an identity between the grammatical logic of 
asserting and the grammatical logic of predicating. 
Rahner's Metaphoric Conception of Analogy 
When Rahner speaks of analogy in the crucial text that Burke cites from 
Foundations and claims that transcendental experience is original and pri-
mary, he is making just such a metaphoric move. That there appears to be no 
prime analogue in the sense Burke expects is not an indication of a weak 
conceptual basis for the analogy Rahner is making between created reality 
and God. Rather, it is a clue that Rahner is making a logical move that Burke 
misses. It is a move that parallels Aquinas's—and for the same reason. It is an 
appeal to analogy, but not to the kind of analogy between concepts that 
Burke supposes. While Burke acknowledges that "transcendental Thomism 
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stressed man's intuitive, non-conceptual grasp of reality,' he takes this only 
as affirming greater emphasis on the nonconceptual (conceived as one side of 
a dialectic between the conceptual and nonconceptual) rather than as a 
radical reconfiguration of what constitutes knowing in the first place. But 
Rahner is not merely offering an apophatic reminder of God's transcen-
dence. He holds that our concepts for God have a fundamentally different 
logical status than concepts about other realities. Even to use the phrases 
"other realities" or "concepts" with respect to God is misleading. God 
conceived as "the one ultimate measure cannot be measured" or grasped 
conceptually in the conventional senses of the terms.75 
Rahner explains this difference of logic in language reminiscent of 
BurrelPs interpretation of Aquinas: since the ultimate measure "is the 
condition of possibility for all categorized distinctions and divisions, it 
cannot itself be distinguished from other things by the same modes of 
distinction."76 That is why Rahner insists, in the quote cited by Burke, that 
analogy is not based on some similarity discerned in concepts but rather in 
our existential relationship to the incomprehensibility of God as Holy 
Mystery. We ourselves exist analogously in and through our being grounded 
in this Holy Mystery, which always surpasses us.77 Our reflexive awareness of 
our knowing, loving, and freedom reveals a kind of anticipation or intimation 
{Vorgriff) of a "whither" that always exceeds our conceptual grasp. It is this 
reflexive awareness that enables us to speak of that incomprehensible Other, 
but without thereby grasping in concepts the One we anticipate. In other 
words, we can identify the "whither" of our transcendence in terms of our 
movement in knowing, loving, and self-commitment. We can speak of that 
Other toward which knowing, freedom, and love move as our "horizon," 
"term," or "goal." In doing so our concepts have not literally described or 
directly grasped God. For all that we truly grasp conceptually is ourselves 
and the openness of our spirit outward beyond ourselves toward an Other 
beyond our reach. Yet this does enable genuine predication. 
"Analogical" for Rahner indicates this radically indirect and reflexive 
manner of predication. God "can be spoken of only in a qualitatively 
different kind of statement."78 Like Burrell, Rahner argues with respect 
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to the statement "God is" that it "is not a proposition which one can 
range alongside other propositions which constitute science" or ordinary 
language. Its logic is of an "utterly different kind."79 This reflexive 
knowledge, he argues, is not secondary or inferior to our grasp of entities 
in objective concepts, but rather is the necessary condition of possibility 
for such objectifications—their flip side, as it were—and, in a sense, more 
original. 
This fits Gerhart and Russell's conception of a metaphoric act because 
Rahner forces an analogy between two "knowns" that changes the larger 
field of meanings. The first known is what Rahner calls "transcendental 
knowing"—or more accurately, the transcendental moment of knowing: 
the reflexive, indirect presence-to-self and anticipation (Vorgriff) of the 
horizon of knowing, love, and freedom. The second known is the knowl-
edge of objects or categorial moment in knowing. Rahner forces an 
analogy by insisting against conventional understanding that the primary 
model for conceptualizing how we understand "knowing" should be the 
transcendental moment rather than the categorial moment. The former is 
not a derivative, secondary, or inferior way of knowing. Forcing the 
analogy, that is to say, speaking of God as known transcendentally rather 
than categorially, creates a logical space for talking of God, even though 
as Holy Mystery God is still beyond our grasp and so can be spoken 
of only in this indirect metaphoric way. The logic of God-talk is 
governed by the intrinsic reflexivity and indirectness of this metaphoric 
signification. 
If this intrinsic reflexivity and indirectness is forgotten, one is liable to 
fall into the mistaken notion that transcendental reality is a transcendental 
"object" that can be known, spoken of, or described in concepts the way 
we conceptualize categorial objects. Rahner's use of terms like "Holy 
Mystery," "nameless whither," "horizon," and "asymptotic goal" are meant 
to call attention to this metaphoric shift in signification. Moreover, charac-
teristic of metaphoric signification, affirming that God is transcendental 
reality effects fundamental and global changes in the available theological 
and metaphysical fields of meanings. The difficulty with Burke's reinterpre-
tation is not that he considers and rejects this metaphoric move, but that he 
appears to miss it altogether. Much the same difficulty is inherent in Kilby's 
nonfoundationalist reading. Rahner's appeal to the transcendental is not 
aimed at establishing an entirely independent philosophical foundation for 
God-talk but rather at reconfiguring how we think and talk about God in 
the first place. Missing this metaphoric move skews not only his understand-
ing of analogy but the fundamental logic of his thought. 
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The Metaphoric Logic of Rahner's Thought 
Many of the statements that Kilby and Burke interpret as paradoxes to 
which Rahner's thought inevitably leads are key articulations of the meta-
phoric logic at the heart of his philosophical and theological vision. To 
interpret his thought, it is necessary to trace how he employs these unex-
pected and "unwarranted" affirmations to open up new conceptual possi-
bilities. In fact, the best Rahner scholarship often does this implicitly, but 
without attention to the metaphoric character of these conceptual moves. 
Focusing more explicitly on this metaphoric aspect of his moves and expli-
cating their logic clarify what is going on in Rahner's thought that is often 
missed. Hence my argument that analyzing the metaphoric logic of 
Rahner's thought is a crucial interpretive step, one that explains why 
Rahner's meaning is misunderstood even in reinterpretations such as 
Kilby's and Burke's that aim to be conscientious as well as critical. 
It would be possible to explore all the central motifs of Rahner's theol-
ogy attentive to its metaphoric logic. For example, he opens up new con-
ceptual space in epistemology with the metaphoric claim that "the supreme 
act of knowledge is not the abolition or diminution of the mystery but its 
final assertion, its eternal and total immediacy."80 At the heart of his 
Christology are several crucial metaphoric claims: that "the closeness and 
the distance . . . of the creature and God do not grow in inverse but like 
proportion";81 that "Christ is most radically man, and his humanity is the 
freest and most independent, not in spite of, but because of its being taken 
up, by being constituted as the self-utterance of God";82 that symbol and 
analogy are based originally in the self-expressiveness of be-ing rather than 
in any likeness between beings; and that there is an identity between the 
Realsymbol and what it symbolizes.83 Then there is also the identity of 
the economic and immanent Trinity; the priority of uncreated grace over 
created grace; the identity of love of God and love of neighbor; and a 
sacramental causality that has retrospective consequences. Of course, rec-
ognizing such claims as metaphoric as such does not prove them true. But 
understanding how they purport to be true (that is to say, how they work 
logically and conceptually) is a necessary first step toward any further 
assessment of their truth and coherence. It would require a monograph, 
at the least, to explicate such metaphoric moves in Rahner's thought. 
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The contrast just discussed between Rahner's metaphoric understanding of 
analogy and Burke's reinterpretation offers an illustration. In lieu of a 
comprehensive analysis, I offer two more. 
Identification of God and Being-As-Such 
I mentioned earlier that Burke regards Thomas Sheehan's "atheological" 
reading of Rahner as one that undermines the very possibility of doctrine 
and objective truth claims. I share reservations about Sheehan's interpreta-
tion but not Burke's conclusion that Sheehan's reading stems from a weak-
ness inherent in Rahner's philosophical stance. Rather, Sheehan's reading is 
problematic for the same reason that Burke's is. He also misses, or at the 
minimum implicitly refuses to follow, Rahner's metaphoric logic. This argu-
ment, which I have made at length elsewhere, can be recapped briefly.84 
The issue centers around Rahner's identification of God and being-as-
such. Sheehan probes the Heideggerian roots of this notion in Rahner and 
concludes that the "baggage" Rahner brings as a believer and from Tho-
mism undermines the insights he derived from Heidegger. The evidence, 
however, indicates to the contrary that Rahner forced an identification 
of meanings that for traditional Thomist metaphysicians and strict 
Heideggerians are incommensurable. He stretched language and thought 
to create conceptual space to say something new. In identifying God as the 
Holy Mystery who claims us but always remains beyond our grasp, Rahner 
transforms both the conventional Thomist and Heideggerian fields of 
meanings. His is not simply the inherited neo-Thomist metaphysical con-
ception of God. His is not merely a Heideggerian recessiveness that 
bespeaks only the claim of finite transcendence. Rahner's metaphoric han-
dling of what he received from Aquinas and Heidegger enables him to 
extract from both of them (both against the conventional interpretations 
of their meanings and in continuity with them) a recognition of our move-
ment toward a horizon that is always ahead of our grasp. In this way 
Rahner uncovers a "clearing"—an "openness"—within which it is possible 
to recognize that we are claimed by the mystery of God. Rahner, like 
Aquinas, handles the "baggage" his faith tradition offers, not as burden-
some freight, but as a rich, supple vocabulary and grammar for theological 
reflection—a vocabulary and grammar capacious enough to appropriate 
insights from Heidegger and Aquinas, just as Aquinas found ways to appro-
priate both neo-Platonic and Aristotelian insights. 
Where Sheehan reads Rahner as unfaithful to his Heideggerian roots, 
Burke, following McDermott, reads him as unfaithful to his Thomist and 
metaphysical roots. Sheehan and Burke presume, correctly, I think, that if 
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narrowly interpreted, Heidegger's thought and Thomist metaphysics are 
incommensurable worlds of meanings. Kilby expresses similar reservations, 
noting that "almost everyone" who has examined Spirit in the World as a 
reading of Aquinas, "beginning with Rahner's own thesis director, has 
found it wanting." 85 Likewise she agrees that those who try to read Spirit 
in the World "as a fundamentally Heideggerian work . . . are forced to see 
Rahner as a very confused Heideggerian."86 Sheehan and Burke also 
assume—but here I disagree—that the only alternatives are to adopt a 
narrowly circumscribed version of one or the other position, or to subsume 
one position into the other. From their respective perspectives they show 
(and also instantiate) that the latter options are doomed to failure. Rahner 
follows the alternative that they do not consider: he explores whether an 
original and different world of meanings can be created by forcing an 
unexpected analogy here. This is the sort of conceptual move characteristic 
of much of Rahner's thought that I propose as a clearer hermeneutical clue 
to its philosophical coherence and theological balance. 
Missing and Rejecting a Metaphoric Move Not the Same 
The question here, I stress, is not whether Sheehan or Burke would agree 
with Rahner's conceptual move. My claim is that neither has recognized it. 
Missing it and rejecting it are not the same thing, although I have little 
doubt that if Burke or Sheehan were to accept the clarifications I offer 
here, they would still object to Rahner's line of reasoning. But in that case, 
there would nevertheless be greater clarity about what is being rejected and 
on what grounds. 
Let me explain a bit further. For those who have read Rahner closely and 
follow his conceptual moves, it is problematic and puzzling that other 
thoughtful commentators, such as Kilby, Burke, and Sheehan, come to 
readings so contrary to the presumptive meanings and conventional inter-
pretations of Rahner's thought. For conventional Rahnerians such critiques 
seem more to misrepresent than to miss the point. Likewise, Kilby and 
Burke attribute to Rahnerians unjustified harmonization of ambiguities, as 
well as interpretations that allegedly go beyond anything Rahner himself 
would have countenanced. Sheehan, for his part, has no hesitation about 
going beyond Rahner in such ways. Still, missing the point is not the same 
as misrepresenting or rejecting a point. Metaphoric moves, because they 
make unexpected and uncalled for uses of conventional terms can easily be 
missed. It is not even necessary that those who propose a metaphoric 
affirmation are themselves explicitly conscious at a theoretical level that 
what they are doing is metaphoric. At the same time, however, reception 
Kilby, Karl Rahner 14. 86 Ibid. 
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(although again not necessarily in a self-conscious way) is a crucial element 
in metaphoric affirmations. The new meanings and logical entailments are 
available only to those who are "alive to them"—who are able and willing 
to accept the reframed field of meanings. It is always possible that one 
might not "get the point."87 
Rahner's Transcendental Perspective: Metaphoric 
Rather Than Foundationalist 
Not getting the point appears to be the case with Kilby's contention that 
Rahner's argument in Hearer of the Word precludes the notion of transcen-
dental revelation in his later theology and that it conflicts with the notion of 
a supernatural existential. Her argument hinges on two claims: (1) that 
Hearer of the Word postulates a sharp either/or opposition between revela-
tion and that which is accessible to human knowing; and (2) that the 
conceptions in his later theology of transcendental revelation and the 
supernatural existential entail that God is in fact accessible to human 
knowing, however imperfectly. 
But Kilby's argument for a sharp either/or opposition between revelation 
and what is accessible to human knowing misses a crucial distinction. The 
logic of "transcendental" applied to "knowledge" in Spirit in the World and 
Hearer of the Word differs in a significant way when applied to "revelation" 
and when presumed in the notion of the supernatural existential. In 
Rahner's early philosophical works, his argument is not that some specific 
categorial experience presupposes and anticipates God as the nameless 
whither of knowing, willing, and loving, but that any categorial experience 
of human knowing, willing, and loving entails this dynamism of the spirit. 
Indeed, it is essential to understand that when Rahner talks about an 
experience of God, he is not talking about some specific experience but 
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rather about a dimension that qualifies all experiences of the human 
spirit.88 Strictly speaking, "transcendental" and "categorial" do not desig-
nate two different ways of knowing, willing, or loving but rather two sides 
of the same activity. There is never one without the other. One never 
escapes the necessity of conversion to the phantasms. 
When this distinction is at issue, the scenario Kilby envisions applies. 
Rahner's argument for a transcendental knowledge of God as a nameless 
whither who could speak or remain silent entails that, no matter how 
unconscious and anonymous this knowledge, it is humanly accessible, at 
least in principle. That is to say, it is something given with human experi-
ence as such, and something in theory that humans could bring to con-
sciousness at least imperfectly for themselves. But it must be noted that 
this transcendental knowing of God entails no self-disclosure of God. God 
known in this way is "grasped at" only as the nameless whither that could 
reveal itself or remain silent. 
Something different is envisioned in Rahner's conception of the super-
natural existential and the related notion of a transcendental revelation. 
A theological postulate (belief that Jesus' life, death, and resurrection 
constitute God's definitive self-communication) reframes the conceptual 
world of Spirit in the World and Hearer of the Word. In his theological 
works, Rahner is inquiring about the transcendental presuppositions of 
that revelation in history rather than about the transcendental presuppo-
sitions of categorial experience in general. In the philosophical analysis, 
"transcendental" and "categorial" specify inseparable flip sides of human 
experience as such. In the theological works, "transcendental" specifies 
the inseparable flip side of the particular events that constitute salvation 
history. The conception of a supernatural existential and transcendental 
revelation is possible only retrospectively because of what God has 
wrought in Jesus and the Spirit, and because this has been made known 
to us in Scripture and tradition. The mutual interaction between the 
transcendental and categorial still applies. There is no transcendental 
dimension or divine self-communication for us without the categorial 
events of salvation history and their culmination in Jesus' life, death, 
and resurrection. Transcendental revelation and the supernatural exis-
tential require those specific categorial events, not just any categorial 
events whatsoever. 
Kilby suggests that a transcendental revelation and supernatural exist-
ential mean that God's self-communication is "part of the ordinary 
human makeup, accessible, however imperfectly, to ordinary means of 
For a helpful discussion of this see Rik Van Nieuwenhove, "Karl Rahner, 
Theologian of the Experience of God?" Louvain Studies 29 (2004) 92-106. 
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knowledge.' This suggestion presupposes that it might be possible to 
escape this interdependence of the transcendental dimension of God's 
self-communication and the actual historical self-disclosure itself in the 
categorial events of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection. But for Rahner the 
interdependence is both ontological and epistemic. Jesus' life, death, and 
resurrection not only reveal God's self-communication; they constitute it. 
In this sense, apart from these events there can be nothing remotely like 
Kilby's "accessing" God's self-communication by ordinary means of knowl-
edge, imperfectly or otherwise. In this sense, apart from those events, there 
is no divine self-communication. This is a crucial implication of Rahner's 
conception of the Realsymbol and what he later refers to as "sacramental 
causality" and "sign causality."90 These notions, which presume Rahner's 
metaphoric assertion of a causality that has retrospective consequences, are 
already implicit in Spirit in the World's "metaphysics of the emanation of 
the faculties from the soul."91 
So this difference in principle between the transcendental knowledge of 
God as the nameless whither of the human spirit and the transcendental 
revelation of God as self-disclosing mystery is implicit in the logic of Spirit in 
the World and Hearer of the Word. Moreover, the difference is not altered by 
the fact that it is God, not two different realities, who is intended in both cases. 
Nor is the difference altered by Rahner's subsequent argument, with the 
notion of the supernatural existential, that God's free self-disclosure must 
have been a factor in human existence from the beginning, and must be a 
factor in human existence generally. The first distinction provides a logic for 
talking about God apart from faith—that is to say, in a way that does not 
presuppose God's self-disclosure or knowledge of that self-disclosure as 
grounds for the discussion. The second distinction provides a logic that 
reframes the former in unexpected and even uncalled for ways in the light of 
God's self-disclosure and the Christian tradition's understanding of that self-
disclosure. In this latter context, it can be said that grace and God's self-
disclosure are at least anonymously accessible to all humanity—but still only 
in virtue of Christ. This conceptual move is metaphoric because it reframes 
things in such unexpected ways, opening up space in which it is possible to say 
both that there is no grace apart from Christ and that grace is universally 
available, at least as offer. This conceptual move is retrospective, or transcen-
dental, because its refraining is possible only in light of what happened in Jesus 
and the Christian understanding of that. It is theological for the same reason. 
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Rahner's appeal to the transcendental was aimed as much at clarifying how 
we think and talk about God as at justifying the legitimacy of such talk. His 
goal, as Endean explains, was never to establish an independent philosophical 
foundation for theology.92 But this did not mean that the role of philosophy 
must collapse into theology or be abandoned. The distinction Rahner pro-
posed between the transcendental and categorial moments of knowing was 
properly philosophical, and he made it for distinctly philosophical, as well as 
theological, reasons. Clearly one can investigate, without appealing to faith or 
revelation, the question about whether the ineffable "whither" of human 
knowing, freedom, and love can be grasped as other realities are grasped, or 
whether all talk of this "whither" must entail a fundamentally different and 
more basic kind of reflexive, indirect, nonconceptual sort of "knowing." This 
latter solution, Rahner's distinction between the transcendental and 
categorial knowing, is radical because it reframes standard ways of thinking 
with the unexpected implication that knowing is at its roots, and most basi-
cally, nonconceptual, nonthematic, and nonobjective. 
Robert Sokolowski has argued persuasively that making just such dis-
tinctions is precisely the task of philosophy.93 Even in metaphysics, he 
contends, "the decisive philosophical move is made by distinctions, not by 
reasoning from effects to causes."94 There is as much evidence for 
interpreting Rahner's appeal to the transcendental along these lines as 
there is for interpreting it as foundationalist in the narrow sense that Kilby 
eschews. One can argue philosophically for or against the distinctions 
Rahner proposes, contend that some are more plausible and others 
unpersuasive, or propose alternative distinctions. This activity is properly 
philosophical because it need not appeal to justifications grounded in reli-
gious beliefs. Moreover, making such distinctions even within a theological 
context is properly philosophical insofar as it prescinds from justifications 
that appeal to religious beliefs. On the other hand, while distinctions 
reached through such efforts might play very helpful roles in theological 
reflection and contribute to conceptual clarification, consistency, and plau-
sibility, there is no necessity to assume with Kilby that they intend to 
establish an independent foundation for faith. Nor is there any necessity 
to assume with Kilby that theological arguments "grounded" in such efforts 
at philosophical perspicuity and consistency are "grounding" in the 
foundationalist or semifoundationalist senses she eschews. She admits 
that Rahner was not consciously or directly addressing the issue of 
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foundationalism as such. But the weight of her objections to Spirit in the 
World and Hearer of the Word, as unpersuasive and as contradicted by his 
later theology, hinges to a large extent on her premise that those works must 
be read as foundationalist. Hence her appeal to interpretations that are often 
against the obvious meaning of the textual evidence and against Rahner's 
intent are no more cogent than this problematic interpretive premise. 
HERMENEUTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
A METAPHORIC READING OF RAHNER 
Of course, asserting that Kilby's critique misinterprets Rahner's meta-
phoric moves as foundational does not attend to important questions she 
raises about the persuasiveness of his distinctions or about the cogency of 
his arguments for them. Likewise, I have hardly touched on the many issues 
that Burke presses Rahnerians to address. All that I have tackled here is a 
more preliminary question about how Kilby's and Burke's readings of 
Rahner's theology are framed. My point in arguing for an alternative inter-
pretive scheme has not been to urge that there is only one correct way to 
read Rahner or assess whether his thought is balanced. Given the signifi-
cant changes in historical, intellectual, and theological contexts, it is imper-
ative to interpret his thought today in dialogue with new interlocutors and 
questions—to read him, as it were, from the outside and from multiple 
perspectives. My evaluation of the reinterpretations of Kilby, Burke, and 
Endean has been narrowly circumscribed. It intends an alternative reading 
that aims at doing justice to the integrity of Rahner's thought and at the 
same time aims to explain how serious interpreters can advance such dif-
ferent readings. The thrust of my suggestion can be summarized in five 
hermeneutical principles for reading Rahner: 
(1) Interpreting Rahner requires taking the metaphoric character of his 
thought into account and carefully attending to its logic. This is espe-
cially important when his conceptual moves reframe the conventional 
theological terrain. 
(2) Given the way Rahner transforms the many sources and inspirations of 
his thought and his extraordinary creativity in refraining the theological 
questions he investigates, a genetic interpretation should give a relative 
priority to the later work over the earlier. This principle contrasts with 
Burke's procedure which gives hegemony to Rahner's early philosophical 
work and neo-Scholastic sources for interpreting the direction of his 
thought. If an architect is constructing a revolutionary kind of building, 
one cannot tell in advance which structures will be foundational. In argu-
ing for a retrospective hermeneutics I intend to assert, however, only a 
Kilby, Karl Rahner 100. 
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relative priority. Obviously genetic information—for example, Endean's 
point about the genesis of Rahner's epistemology in his early reflections 
on grace—can have immense significance for an accurate reading. 
(3) For the same reasons, relative priority should be given to an internal 
reading. This should not be an excuse for denying ambiguities in 
Rahner's work or its limitations, but it does caution against readings 
like Kilby's that are contrary to the presumptive meaning of what 
Rahner says, or readings that emphasize consistency with one or 
another text over principles of consistency that emerge from the whole 
of Rahner's work. 
(4) Significance should always be given to Rahner's performance as well as 
to his theoretical and methodological pronouncements. Rahner, for 
example, never worked out an explicit theory of analogy. In his 
published writings apart from a very early article, he says little about 
Heidegger. He said nothing explicitly about the sort of metaphoric 
logic I have attributed to his thought. In the first instance, interpreta-
tion must rely on attentive analysis of his actual appeals to analogy and 
uses of analogous language. In the second instance, interpretation must 
discern where Rahner follows Heidegger's lead and where he takes a 
different direction. In the third instance, the justifications I have 
offered for the metaphoric logic of Rahner's thought are based on 
analysis of how he argues rather than on any explicit statement in his 
arguments about metaphoric process. 
(5) The case I suggest for a retrospective hermeneutic of Rahner's meta-
phoric moves attentive to its internal coherence and actual execution 
should not be taken as an effort somehow to isolate Rahner's theology 
from the sort of theological and dogmatic criteria of accuracy and truth 
that must be applied to all theological claims. To argue that a conceptual 
move is metaphoric is not to prove it true or to dodge the question of 
truth but only to make a claim about how it purports to be true. So it is 
not illegitimate for Burke to ask whether Rahner's "emphasis on Christ's 
humanity really encompasses the traditional Christology of the Church, 
as he claimed it did." On the other hand, to answer a question such as 
this legitimately, it is crucial to make sure that Rahner's metaphoric logic 
has been taken into account and not simply missed or dismissed.96 
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